

The Price of Sin: The Effects of Social Norms on Markets

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Abstract: We provide evidence for the effects of social norms on markets by studying “sin” stocks—publicly traded companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. We hypothesize that there is a societal norm against funding operations that promote vice and that some investors, particularly institutions subject to norms, pay a financial cost in abstaining from these stocks. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that sin stocks are less held by norm-constrained institutions such as pension plans as compared to mutual or hedge funds that are natural arbitrageurs, and they receive less coverage from analysts than stocks of otherwise comparable characteristics. Sin stocks also have higher expected returns than otherwise comparable stocks. We find no systematic relationship between sin stock returns and various proxies for litigation risk, which suggests that sin stocks are underpriced due to them being neglected by norm-constrained investors. Evidence from corporate financing decisions and time variation in norms for tobacco also suggests that norms affect stock prices and returns.

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I. Introduction

Many social scientists believe that social norms are important in shaping economic behavior and market outcomes, overriding at times even the profit motive.¹ An early articulation of this viewpoint in economics is Becker's (1957) model of discrimination. In his model, agents (e.g., employers) with discriminatory tastes arising from community norms pay for those tastes by bearing financial costs from their decisions to not interact with particular types of people. Arrow (1972) points out that a complete theory of discrimination also must explain why entrepreneurs without discriminatory tastes cannot make profits by hiring labor cheaply from the groups discriminated against by other employers. Subsequent theories of social norms (e.g., Akerlof (1980), Romer (1984)) provide sufficient conditions under which social customs that are disadvantageous to the individual nevertheless may persist if individuals are sanctioned by loss of reputation for disobedience of the custom.² Empirical work on the effects of social norms on markets has traditionally focused upon measuring the extent of discrimination in the labor market.³ A related literature points out that social interactions (or peer effects) more generally are important for a variety of economic outcomes (see, e.g., Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002)).⁴

In this paper, we provide new evidence on the market effects of social norms in the novel setting of the stock market. Specifically, we study the investing environment of "sin" stocks, i.e. publicly traded companies involved in the production of alcohol, tobacco, and gaming. This is an ideal setting in which to study the effects of social norms on markets for several reasons. First, there is clearly a societal norm against funding operations that promote human vice, and

¹ There are various definitions of the concept of a social norm or custom. Following Akerlof (1980), we define a social norm or custom as an act whose utility to the agent performing it depends in some way on the beliefs or actions of other members of the community.

² See Elster (1989) for a review of social norms and economic theory.

³ For a survey of this literature, see Altonji and Blank (1999); and for a recent summary of this work, see Levitt (2004). Many papers have developed clever empirical approaches to identifying the extent of racial discrimination in the labor market. However, the evidence to date supporting taste-based discrimination (as opposed to rational information-based theories) has been mixed.

⁴ A growing body of empirical research speaks to the importance of peer-effects in a variety of contexts (see, e.g., Case and Katz (1991) and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996)). Recent work on social interaction and financial markets focuses primarily on investor behavior (see, e.g., Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004)). There are few papers on whether peer effects have price implications.

consequently many investors may not want themselves or others to support these companies by investing in their stocks. Recent anecdotal evidence supporting this premise can be found in the rise of socially responsible investment (SRI) as a mutual fund asset class in which managers screen their investments to rule out sinful stocks such as alcohol, tobacco, and gaming companies. The Social Investment Forum estimates that this asset class contained about \$2.34 trillion dollars in 2001 or roughly 12% of the total assets under management in that year (see Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2003)), which suggests a potentially sizeable effect of socially responsible investing on the prices of sin stocks. Second, the stock market provides us with a rich set of data on investor behavior, stock pricing, and firm behavior, which allows us to discriminate more finely among alternative hypotheses than do existing empirical studies of social norms.

A third reason why the stock market is ideally suited for an investigation of market effects from social norms is that there can be significant financial costs associated with norm-constrained investing, i.e. investors pay for their discriminatory tastes à la Becker. To begin with, there is the cost of being unable to diversify into publicly traded sin companies, although this cost is small since there are few of these firms relative to the universe of stocks. More importantly, as we show below, sin stocks tend to be relatively cheap (i.e., with low price-to-book or price-to-earnings ratios) when benchmarked against comparables. Finally, Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2003) find that from the perspective of an investor who seeks to create an optimal portfolio from mutual funds, limiting oneself to funds that include social objectives in their investment policies can be very costly. For instance, an investor who believes that returns are generated by a multifactor pricing model can incur a certainty-equivalent cost of 30 basis points per month, while an investor who believes in managerial skill can incur a cost of more than 100 basis points per month. Importantly, these calculations take as given that there are few publicly traded sin stocks in the marketplace. In reality, the number of sin stocks is likely to be endogenous, depending on the degree to which investors shun them because of social norms.

We begin our investigation of social norm effects on investments in sin stocks by looking at who owns these stocks. First, we hypothesize that the shares of sin stocks should be held in smaller proportions by institutions subject to social norm pressures. These include institutions whose positions in stocks are public information, institutions with diverse constituents, and institutions that can be readily exposed to public scrutiny (e.g., picketing by an unhappy minority). Examples include pension funds, universities, religious organizations, banks, and insurance companies. This hypothesis further implies that sin stocks should be less followed by sell-side analysts who produce financial reports and analyses on companies, since these analysts tend to cater to institutional investors. In contrast to institutional investors, individual investors can keep their stock positions out of the view of enforcers of societal norms, and therefore we expect individual investors to be more willing than institutional investors to hold sin stocks. Mutual funds and hedge funds represent another class of investors whom we expect to be willing to invest in sin stocks, since they are natural arbitrageurs in the marketplace. While even mutual and hedge funds may be increasingly subject to social norm pressures as witnessed by the recent growth of the socially responsible investment class, we expect some of them to flout social conventions and buy sin stocks if those stocks are neglected by other investors and priced cheaply.⁵

Consistent with these predictions, we find that sin stocks have less institutional ownership, as compared to stocks of otherwise comparable characteristics during the period of 1980-2003 for which data are available. Our identification strategy throughout comes from judging sin stock outcomes (e.g., institutional ownership, stock returns, etc.) relative to carefully chosen industry comparables and controls of stock characteristics, i.e. our effects are coming from sin status as opposed to unobserved heterogeneity related to industry or other stock characteristics. Using our most conservative estimates, the sin stock comparables (defined as

⁵ An example of such a fund is the VICE mutual fund, which openly promotes holding vice stocks; however, these examples are rare and typically small in size.

those with similar Fama-French (1997) industry groupings as our sin stocks) have on average about 22% of their shares held by institutions. In contrast, sin stocks have about 19% of their shares held by institutions, which is approximately a 14 percent lower institutional ownership ratio than their comparables. In addition, sin stocks receive less analyst coverage during the period of 1976-2003 for which data are available. The typical sin stock comparable in our sample receives coverage from about 2.5 analysts. Sin stocks on average are followed by 2.1 analysts, representing a 16 percent decline in coverage relative to the mean.

When we break down this analysis by types of institutions (banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors, and others, such as pension plans and universities), we find that shares of sin stocks are not held in smaller proportions by mutual funds and independent investment advisors, who are the natural arbitrageurs among these institutions.⁶ This set of disaggregated results suggests that the low institutional ownership of sin stocks cannot be explained by a story in which institutions are smarter than individuals, since the result does not hold for the mutual funds and hedge funds that are likely to be the smartest investors among these institutions.

Next, we formulate our predictions about the effects of social norms on the returns to investing in sin stocks. There are at least two reasons why sin stocks should be cheaper than other stocks and hence outperform comparables, even after accounting for well-known predictors of stock returns. The first is the increased litigation risk associated with the products of sin companies, which is further heightened by social norms. For example, tobacco companies faced substantial litigation risk until their settlement with state governments in 1997. The second is a pure neglect effect. According to the logic in Merton (1987), the neglect of sin stocks by an important set of investors, such as institutions, means that the prices of those stocks will be depressed relative to their fundamental values because of limited risk-sharing. Indeed, many

⁶ The category of independent investment advisor is a hodge-podge of different institutions that includes hedge funds. Accordingly, it makes sense for us to include them with mutual funds as natural arbitrageurs.

practitioners believe that sin stocks are underpriced. For instance, David Berman (2002) writes that "...sin stocks come with other advantages besides stability. Most of these stocks have lower valuations than the overall market. Some of them also offer excellent dividends....Finally, sin stocks tend to benefit from very conservative accounting because their industries fall under considerable scrutiny from regulators."⁷ Implicit in the neglect effect hypothesis is an assumption of limited arbitrage, i.e. not enough arbitrage capital is brought to bear on sin stocks because of a set of constraints and risks articulated by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and others.⁸

We test our predictions of sin stocks being underpriced and outperforming comparables by analyzing both prices and returns. First and most conventionally, using time-series regressions during the period of 1926-2004, we find that a portfolio long sin stocks and short their comparables has a return of 45 basis points per month after adjusting for the CAPM and 39 basis points per month after adjusting for a four-factor model comprising of the three Fama-French factors and the momentum (returns) factor. Second, using cross-sectional regressions controlling for firm characteristics (data only available from 1965-2004), we find that sin stocks outperform their comparables by 30 basis points a month—again statistically and economically sizeable magnitude—even after accounting for well-known determinants of expected returns in cross-sectional regressions such as market size, past return, and market-to-book ratio. Third, we compare the market-to-book ratios of sin stocks to those of other stocks. The market-to-book ratios of sin stocks are on average about 15 percent lower than those of other companies after controlling for differences in other stock characteristics, an economically and statistically significant effect during the period of 1965-2004. Our analysis of sin stock prices using market-to-book ratios is more conservative than our analysis of returns, since the realized returns of

⁷ See http://www.moneysense.ca/shared/print.jsp?content=20021127_154845_3424 to retrieve the article.

⁸ In other words, Arrow (1972) is right to point out the opportunity for entrepreneurial investors to exploit the discriminatory tastes of other investors, but there are not enough entrepreneurial investors to completely eliminate the impact of discriminatory tastes on stock prices.

certain sin stocks (tobacco) may be influenced by unexpectedly good cash flow news over our sample period.

We then attempt to gauge the relative importance of litigation risk versus the neglect effect in explaining the behavior of sin stock returns. Using a number of different tests, we find limited evidence to support the litigation risk hypothesis. First, when we exclude tobacco stocks from our analysis of sin stock prices, we find similar return effects among alcohol and gaming stocks that possessed little litigation risk during the period of 1926-2004. Second, the returns of tobacco stocks during the period 1998-2004—a period of arguably reduced litigation risk but heightened demand for socially responsible investing—are if anything higher relative to comparables than they were prior to the 1997 tobacco settlement. Third, we find that the returns of tobacco stocks are not significantly related to potential proxies for litigation risk, such as the fraction of income generated in foreign markets.

We further validate our characterization of the prices of sin stocks as being influenced by social norms by taking advantage of time variation in the social norms governing tobacco consumption. The major source of time variation in social norms in our analysis stems from the changing public perception of smoking, which was not considered a vice until the sixties. Accordingly, we expect tobacco stocks to emerge as under-priced stocks and hence to outperform comparables after the sixties, and this is indeed what we find.

Finally, as a consequence of stock underpricing due to social norms, we predict that sin companies should finance their operations using relatively more debt than equity, since debt markets tend to be less transparent than equity markets as we argue below. Using data from 1962-2003, we confirm that sin companies have significantly higher leverage after accounting for the usual predictors of capital structure. Whereas the typical sin stock comparable in our sample has a market leverage of 27%, the market leverage of sin companies is 14 percent higher than the mean.

Our findings on the effects of social norms in the context of the stock market strongly support the viewpoint that social norms can have important consequences for markets. Indeed, our results most likely represent lower bounds on the effects of social norms in the stock market, since many companies operating in sin industries may not become public precisely because they are shunned by many investors. Our examination of stock market effects from social norms is related to an interesting paper by Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001), who develop a model to consider the price implications of ethical investing that excludes companies that pollute. Their price implications are similar to the ones tested here. One of the key findings from their calibrated model suggests that significant price effects emerge when around 20% of investors shun a stock for social norm reasons. Since it has been estimated that one out of every nine dollars under professional management in the United States today is involved in SRI, significant price effects are indeed plausible and consistent with the calibrations of Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner. Indeed, if the estimated magnitude of SRI activity is accurate, then this social norm-based investing phenomenon would be as big as S&P 500 indexing, and the price effects we find would be of comparable significance to the effect of S&P 500 indexing on stock prices.

Our paper also is related to the work of Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan (1999), who examine the effect of the shareholder boycott of South Africa's apartheid regime. They find that for all the visibility associated with the boycott, there was little discernible effect either on the valuations of banks and corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets, because corporate involvement in South Africa was small in the first place. However, they do find some weak evidence that institutional shareholdings in corporations with South African investments increased when those corporations divested.

The rest of our paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we provide a background history of sin stocks and describe how we identify these stocks in our analysis. In Section III, we complete the description of our data set and specify the variables for our regression models. In

Section IV, we report the empirical results from our regression analyses. Robustness checks and extensions are discussed in Section V. We conclude in Section VI.

II. Background on and Selection of Sin Stocks

Our analysis of social norm effects on the stock market focuses on the industries collectively known as the “Triumvirate of Sin,” namely alcohol, tobacco and gaming. Today, all three of these consumer product groups are viewed as sinful by many individuals and social groups in the United States and other countries, due to their addictive properties and undesirable social consequences when consumed excessively. While the sinful aspects of alcohol and gaming have long been recognized by societies into which they have been introduced, tobacco has been the subject of negative social norms only as recently as the past four decades. Our analysis will exploit the time variation in the social norms governing tobacco consumption to test various predictions of social norm effects in financial markets.

Tobacco consumption has been viewed as sinful for only a relatively short period since its introduction to Europe in the mid-sixteenth century.⁹ This is because the adverse individual and public health consequences of smoking tobacco were not widely known until the mid-1960’s. Indeed, most early European physicians subscribed to the Native American belief that tobacco might be an effective medicine. As cigarette smoking grew in prevalence during the early twentieth century, however, articles addressing the adverse health effects of smoking began to appear in scientific and medical journals. Studies beginning in 1930 led the American Cancer Society to warn by 1944 about the ill effects of smoking, though most of the public remained unaware of the statistical correlation between smoking and cancer. This changed, however, in 1952 when Reader’s Digest published an article entitled “Cancer by the Carton,” which detailed the dangers of smoking.

⁹ The following material on tobacco is drawn from a CNN website profiling the tobacco industry, <http://edition.cnn.com/US/9705/tobacco/history>.

Although the tobacco industry responded with marketing and studies of their own, thus managing to stave off negative public opinion for another decade, this battle came to an end in the early 1960's with the formation of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health. Convened in response to political pressures and a growing body of scientific evidence, the committee released a 387-page report in 1964 unequivocally concluding that cigarette smoking is causally related to lung cancer. In 1965, Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act requiring surgeon general's warnings on all packages, and in 1971, all broadcast advertising of tobacco products was banned.

Like alcohol, gambling has long been considered a vice and a sinful activity that corrupts society. In most societies, gambling is heavily regulated because of concerns about criminal involvement. Since the mid-to-late 1990's, however, a number of states in the United States have deregulated casino gaming to legalize its production outside of Native American casinos, under pressure from both political referendums and budget concerns. According to a report from the National Gambling Commission, by 1999, twenty-six states had joined Nevada and Atlantic City (New Jersey) in legalizing casino-style gaming.¹⁰ Hence, one could argue that gaming has become more socially acceptable in recent years, though many surveys of individuals across many states indicate that public opinion still regards gambling as sinful behavior.¹¹

Based upon the Triumvirate of Sin described above, we identify sin stocks from the universe of stocks in the following manner. We start with the Fama and French (1997) classification of stocks based upon their SIC codes into 48 industries. Stocks in Fama-French industry group 4 (beer or alcohol) and industry group 5 (smoke or tobacco) are classified as sin stocks. Stocks with SIC codes 2100-2199 belong to the beer group, and those with SIC codes of 2080-2085 are in the smoke group. Unfortunately, the Fama-French classification scheme does

¹⁰ For more information regarding this report and discussion of legislative changes in gaming, see Chen and Bin (2001).

¹¹ See for instance surveys reported in a Congressional report on gaming that may be found online at <http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/>.

not separate gaming stocks from hotel stocks or other entertainment stocks. To this end, we need to use the NAICS classification, which identifies gaming stocks as those bearing the following NAICS codes: 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329, 713290, 72112, and 721120. In sum, sin stocks in our analysis comprise the union of the Fama and French (1997) industry groups 4 and 5 along with the NAICS group for gaming. We will work with this expanded 49-industry group throughout our analysis.

We then augment this list by searching across companies at the segment level, as follows. We utilize the COMPUSTAT Segments Data, available from 1985-2004, which contains information on the SIC and NAICS codes of the different segments of a company. We identify a company as a sin stock if any of its segments has a SIC code in either the beer or the smoke group or an NAICS code in the gaming group, as defined above. Accordingly, our final list of sin stocks is the union of two screening procedures—one applying the Fama and French (1997) and NAICS classifications at the company level and the second applying the same classifications at the segment level using COMPUSTAT segments data. The latter screen on company segment information is essential for obtaining an accurate list of sin stocks, since many companies such as Philip Morris, now known as Altria, have diversified operations. We are unable to implement the augmented search for stocks no longer in existence by 1985, since the segments data is available only after 1985. For stocks listed before 1985 and still in existence after 1985, we back-fill this augmentation procedure—i.e., a stock identified as sinful using the segments data will be characterized as sinful throughout its history.

A list of the sin stocks identified through the above screening procedure, containing Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) permno, company name, and the time period of coverage in our data set, can be obtained from the authors' websites. The list contains many well-known names such as Altria, Anheuser Busch Co., Bacardi, Bally, Caesars, Loews, Mandalay, and Trump Hotels. We also performed some cross-checks of this list with searches of popular books on sin investing (e.g., Ahrens (2004) and Waxler (2004)) and various online

sources, to confirm the accuracy of this list. By and large, our screening procedure appears to yield an accurate and comprehensive list of stocks in the alcohol, tobacco, and gaming industries.

Table 1 provides a more systematic year-by-year look at our data set of sin stocks beginning in 1926 and ending in 2004.¹² There are a total of 193 distinct names, comprised of 36 distinct tobacco companies, 62 distinct alcohol companies, and 95 distinct gaming companies. There are not a lot of sin stocks—only 63 even in 2004—relative to the thousands of stocks in the universe. While the numbers of tobacco and alcohol stocks have stayed relatively constant through the years, the number of gaming stocks increased significantly in the 1990's with the ongoing deregulation of the gaming industry. As we mentioned earlier, this recent trend suggests that gaming may be gaining more widespread social acceptance. As we also have indicated, however, there are a number of other factors underlying this trend.

We further characterize these sin stocks in Panel B of Table 1 by calculating the market betas for the period of 1962-2003 of the different industry portfolios, using data from Fama and French (1997). The market betas are calculated using the time-series of monthly returns on the 49 (value-weighted) industry portfolios (the original 48 Fama and French (1997) industries plus gaming).¹³ The three portfolios of interest (beer, smoke, and gaming) have betas of 0.76, 0.74, and 1.15, respectively. As suggested by practitioners, beer and smoke appear to have somewhat lower betas during the period of 1962-2003—the only industries with comparably small numbers are utilities, food, gold, and oil—whereas gaming stocks have betas comparable to those of many other industries.

While we focus on the so-called Triumvirate of Sin (alcohol, tobacco, and gaming), two other classes of stocks are sometimes thought of as sinful. The first is the sex industry. However,

¹² Importantly, in our time-series tests that span a longer horizon, tobacco stocks are considered sinful only in the post-1965 period.

¹³ Note that in calculating these betas, we have not excluded the gaming stocks from the Fama and French portfolios. This is unlikely to bias the estimates of beta for the different industries by a significant amount, since there are so few gaming stocks.

there are very few publicly traded companies with heavy operations in sex.¹⁴ Therefore, omitting these companies will not affect our results in any significant way. The second is the defense industry. We have decided against including defense as a sin industry in our main analysis because it is not clear that defense is considered a sin by many Americans. As a robustness exercise, however, we later broaden our definition of sin stocks to include stocks in Fama and French (1997) industry grouping 26 (guns).

III. Data

Having described our procedure for identifying sin stocks, we now characterize our data collection on the universe of stocks. Our data on U.S. firms come from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and COMPUSTAT. From CRSP, we obtain daily closing stock prices, daily shares outstanding, and daily dollar trading volumes for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks over the period of 1962-2003.¹⁵ From COMPUSTAT, we obtain annual information on a variety of accounting variables during the same period. To be included in our sample, a firm must have the requisite financial data from both CRSP and COMPUSTAT. We follow other studies in focusing on companies with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11 and excluding firms with one-digit SIC codes of 6, which belong to the financial services industry.¹⁶

Our data on ownership structures comes from the CDA Spectrum Database of 13-F filings by institutional investors, defined as those managing at least \$100 million dollars in assets. This database reports holdings of a particular stock in terms of shares held by various classes of institutional investors. The five institution types are banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, independent investment advisors (which includes hedge funds), and others (including universities,

¹⁴ Two public companies with large sex operations, according to practitioners, are Playboy Enterprises and the Barcelona-based Private Media Group. However, many other large entertainment conglomerates profit off sex on cable through holdings in various subsidiaries that are difficult to track down.

¹⁵ A notable exception is the series of monthly returns that we use for the time-series regressions, which spans the period 1926-2004.

¹⁶ Another screen sometimes used in empirical analyses over the universe of stocks is to drop firms with book values of less than 10 million dollars. We have replicated our analyses below using this additional screen and found similar results.

pension plans, and employee ownership plans). While the 13-F filing is available quarterly, most companies only file timely reports on a semi-annual basis, at the end of June and at the end of December. Our analysis will focus on the end-of-year filings. Our data on analyst coverage come from the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (IBES) database, which reports the number of analyst estimates of earnings issued on a stock at various points in time (typically quarterly).

A. Variables in Ownership Regressions

Institutional ownership (IO_{it}) is the fraction of the shares of company i held by institutions in the CDA Spectrum Database at the end of year t . IO is calculated by aggregating the shares held by all five types of institutions at the end of the year and then dividing this amount by shares outstanding at the end of the year (Item 25 in COMPUSTAT). $LOGSIZE_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of firm i 's market capitalization (price times shares outstanding) at the end of year t . $LOGMB_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of firm i 's market cap divided by its book value at the end of year t . VAR_{it} is the variance of daily (simple, raw) returns during year t . $BETA_{it}$ is the beta of firm i 's industry, among the 49 industries listed in Table 1, in year t . $PRINV_{it}$ is the inverse of firm i 's share price at the end of year t . RET_{it} is the average monthly return on stock i during year t .

The summary statistics for these variables are provided in Panel A of Table 2. The time-series average of the cross-sectional means of IO is 0.27, and the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviations of IO is 0.22. In other words, in a typical year, a typical firm has about 27% of its shares held by institutions, and the standard deviation of institutional ownership in a typical cross-section is 22%. The other variables are standard and do not merit discussion, except to report that their summary statistics are similar to those found in earlier studies.

B. Variables in Analyst Coverage Regressions

Our measure of analyst coverage is $LOGCOV_{it}$, defined as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts covering firm i at the end of year t . As in earlier studies, stocks that

do not appear in IBES are assumed to have no analyst estimates.¹⁷ The other variables used in these regressions are constructed in the same way as those in the ownership regressions. The summary statistics for these variables over the period of 1976-2003 are reported in Panel B of Table 2. Note that the time-series average of the cross-sectional means of *LOGCOV* is 0.91, and the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviations is 0.99. Thus in a typical year, a typical firm has about 2.5 analysts with a standard deviation of about 2.7 analysts. The summary statistics for the other variables in Panel B differ slightly from those in Panel A because of their different sample periods.

C. Variables in Time-Series Return Regressions

In our time-series return regressions, the dependent variable $EXSINP_t$ is the monthly return of an equal-weighted portfolio of sin stocks in month t , net of the risk-free rate. $EXCOMP_t$ is the monthly return of an equal-weighted portfolio of stocks that includes stocks that belong to the Fama and French (1997) industry groups 2 (food), 3 (soda), 7 (fun), and 43 (meals and hotels), net of the risk-free rate. $MKTPREM_t$ is the monthly return of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio in month t , net of the risk-free rate. SMB_t , HML_t , and MOM_t are well-known portfolio return series downloaded from Ken French's website. SMB is the monthly return of a portfolio that is long on small stocks and short on large stocks. HML is the monthly return of a portfolio that is long on high book-to-market stocks and short on low book-to-market stocks. MOM is the monthly return of a portfolio that is long on past one-year return winners and short on past one-year return losers. The summary statistics for the various portfolio returns are presented in Panel C of Table 2.

¹⁷ If a stock does not have an analyst estimate at the end of the year, we look backwards through the year to find the most recent estimate and use this as the measure of analyst coverage for the firm during the year. Alternatively, we also have experimented with using October 1 as a cut-off date. In other words, if a stock does not have any analyst estimates in the last quarter, then it is recorded as having zero analyst estimates for the year.

D. Variables in Cross-Sectional Return Regressions

Our empirical analyses of stock returns will employ monthly measures of returns as dependent variables. In our cross-sectional return regressions, the dependent variable $EXMRET_{it}$ is the monthly return of an individual stock i in month t net of the risk-free rate. $LOGSIZE_{it}$ is defined as in Panel A, except that we now calculate $LOGSIZE_{it}$ on a monthly as opposed to annual basis. $BETA_{it}$ is the time-varying beta of the industry to which firm i belongs, calculated over the most recent three years of monthly data leading up to and including month t . $TURN_{it}$ is the average of daily share turnover in stock i —defined as shares traded divided by shares outstanding—during month t . $LOGMB_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of stock i at the end of month t . RET_{it} is the average of the most recent twelve months of returns on stock i leading up to and including month t . Finally, $LOGAGE$ is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, measured by the number of years available in the CRSP/Compustat data. The summary statistics of these variables are reported in Panel D of Table 2.

E. Variables in Price-to-Book Regressions

$LOGMB_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of firm i ’s market-to-book ratio measured at the end of year t . ROE_{it} is firm i ’s return on equity in year t . ROE is calculated as the ratio of earnings during year t over the book value of equity at the end of year t . Earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items available to common stockholders (Item 237), plus deferred taxes from the income statement (Item 50), plus investment tax credit (Item 51). $RDSALES_{it}$ is the fraction of firm i ’s research and development expenditures (Item 46) to firm sales (Item 12) in year t . We also introduce $RDMISS_{it}$, which is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i ’s R&D expenditures observation in year t is missing. $SP500_{it}$ is a dummy variable equal to one if company i is part of the S&P 500 Index in year t . The time-series average of the cross-sectional means of $LOGMB$ is 0.37, and the time-series average of the cross-sectional standard deviations is 0.76. Thus in a typical year, a typical firm in our sample has a market-to-book ratio of 1.45

with a standard deviation of about 2.14. The summary statistics for these variables are reported in Panel E of Table 2.

F. Variables in Corporate Financing Decision Regressions

The book leverage of firm i in year t , denoted by $BLEV_{it}$, is total debt divided by the sum of total debt and book equity ((Item 9+Item 34)/(Item 9+Item 34+Item 216)), measured at fiscal year-end. We also use market leverage, denoted by $MLEV_{it}$, which is the same as $BLEV$ except that we replace Item 216 with the firm's market capitalization (the average of firm i 's market capitalization over calendar year t). $CASH_{it}$ is firm i 's cash balances (Item 1) divided by book assets at the start of year t (Item 6). For firm i in year t , $PAYOUT_{it}$ is calculated as COMPUSTAT Item 115 minus preferred stock reduction plus Item 21, all divided by net income (Item 172), where the preferred stock reduction is the maximum between zero and the difference between the previous year's Item 10 and the current year's Item 10. We then break down this payout variable into its constituent parts. $DIVPAY_{it}$ is firm i 's dividend payout ratio in year t , namely Item 21 divided by Item 172. REP_{it} is firm i 's repurchases divided by net income in year t (Item 115 minus preferred stock reduction, all divided by Item 172).

Tobin's Q, $TOBQ_{it}$, is the market value of equity (price times shares outstanding from CRSP) plus assets minus the book value of equity (Item 60+Item 74), all divided by assets, measured at the end of year t . Asset tangibility, $TANG_{it}$, is defined as firm i 's net plant, property, and equipment (Item 8) divided by total assets at the end of year t (Item 6) and expressed in percentage terms. Profitability, $PROFIT_{it}$, is defined as earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (Item 13) divided by total assets at the end of year t and expressed in percentage terms. Finally, $LOGSALES_{it}$ is the natural logarithm of net sales of firm i in year t (Item 12).

IV. Results

A. Institutional Ownership

In this section, we test whether the shares of sin stocks are less held by institutions that are subject to social norm pressures, while controlling for a host of other firm characteristics such as firm size and stock beta. We hypothesize that institutions such as pension funds, universities, religious organizations, banks, and insurance companies are less willing than other types of investors to hold sin stocks due to the public nature of their investments, their diverse constituencies, and their exposure to public scrutiny (e.g., picketing by an unhappy minority).

Our empirical objective is to determine whether sin stocks have a different institutional investor following than do other stocks. Our task is complicated by the fact that sin stocks will differ from other stocks along a number of other dimensions such as firm size and firm beta. Indeed, earlier research has identified some key firm characteristics that are correlated with institutional ownership.¹⁸ For example, one reason why firm size is correlated with ownership by institutions is that institutions tend to avoid small stocks because of liquidity issues. In this paper, we remain agnostic about why certain firm characteristics tend to be correlated with ownership by institutions. Our strategy is to soak up as much of the cross-sectional variation as possible so that we can better identify the differential effect of sin stocks compared to non-sin stocks.

To this end, we estimate the following regression specification:

$$IO_{it} = a_0 + a_1 SINDUM_{it} + \mathbf{a}_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad i=1, \dots, N, \quad (1)$$

where $SINDUM$ equals one if the stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise, \mathbf{X}_{it} is a vector of firm characteristics and ε_{it} is measurement error. \mathbf{X}_{it} includes various permutations of the following variables defined earlier: $LOGSIZE$, $BETA$, $LOGMB$, $PRINV$, VAR , and RET . Also included in

¹⁸ For evidence related to predictors of institutional ownership, see Del Guercio (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001).

the set of control variables are *NASD*, a dummy that equals one if the stock is listed on NASDAQ and zero otherwise; and *SP500*, a dummy variable that equals one if the stock is part of the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest is a_1 , which measures whether sin stocks have a different ownership structure than other stocks, controlling for the other firm characteristics contained in \mathbf{X}_i . The null hypothesis is that a_1 equals zero, whereas our prediction is that it will be significantly less than zero.

In order to interpret the coefficient on the sin stock dummy variable *SINDUM* as a test of social norm effects, we must address the possibility that it might pick up other effects associated with the industries in which our sin stocks reside. In particular, our sin stocks tend to be consumer goods, and it is possible that consumer goods differ from other industries in terms of attracting institutional ownership. To eliminate this potentially confounding interpretation, we create two new control variables. The first and more straightforward one is *ONEDIGDUM*, which equals one if a stock resides in the same one-digit SIC code industry as any of our sin stocks and zero otherwise. With the inclusion of *ONEDIGDUM*, our *SINDUM* effect cannot be interpreted in terms of institutions favoring certain one-digit SIC code industries over others.

A more subtle and potentially more conservative way to address the issue of related industry effects on institutional ownership is to find comparables for our sin stocks. Conveniently, the Fama and French (1997) industry groups 2 (food), 3 (soda), 7 (fun), and 43 (meals and hotels) provide natural comparables to our sin stocks. Indeed, in some other industry classification schemes, beer is often lumped together with soda, as is tobacco or smoke with food and gaming with fun and meals. Accordingly, we create the dummy variable *GDUM*, which equals one if a stock resides in the set of Fama and French (1997) industry classifications 2 (food), 3 (soda), 4 (beer), 5 (smoke), 7 (fun), 43 (meals), and our 49th industry (gaming), and zero otherwise. With *GDUM* as a control variable, our sin stock effect cannot be interpreted in terms of institutions favoring other industries over the consumer industries included in the definition of

GDUM. This careful matching of sin stocks to industry comparables and other stock characteristics is the core of our identification strategy.

We estimate our regression model using the ultra-conservative method of running a pooled (panel) regression and calculating standard errors by clustering at the industry level (using our 49 industry groupings). This approach addresses the concern that the errors, conditional on the independent variables, are correlated within industry groupings (e.g., Moulton (1986)). One reason why this may occur is that if an institution decides to invest in a stock in a particular industry, it also may invest in comparables in the same industry for reasons of liquidity or diversification. We also have estimated our model using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology with Newey and West (1987) standard errors, and we obtain similar results. We report our findings from the estimation with industry-clustered standard errors because this method makes fewer assumptions about how the errors are correlated over time, and thus it is likely to give us more conservative standard errors.¹⁹

Our results from estimating various specifications of equation (1) are reported in Panel A of Table 3. In column (1), we report our estimates of a model that includes as independent variables *SINDUM*, *ONEDIGDUM*, *LOGSIZE*, *BETA*, *NASD*, and *SP500*. We find that the coefficient in front of *SINDUM* is -0.0519 and is statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The coefficient in front of *ONEDIGDUM* is positive but tiny and statistically insignificant. The mean institutional ownership in our sample is 24%. There is no difference in institutional ownership between sin stock comparables in the same one-digit SIC code and the rest of the sample. In contrast, sin stocks on average have about 19% of their shares held by institutions, which represents about a 21 percent shortfall relative to the mean. Both *LOGSIZE* and *BETA* attract positive and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that institutions seem to favor big firms and firms from industries with high market betas. Finally, *NASDAQ*

¹⁹ Where appropriate, we also have performed tobit regressions. The results of the tests remain qualitatively similar.

stocks and stocks in the S&P 500 Index have less institutional ownership as compared to other stocks.²⁰

In column (2), we replace *ONEDIGDUM* with *GDUM*. The estimated coefficient on *GDUM* bears a negative sign (-0.0167), suggesting that institutions may shy away from consumer goods relative to other industries, but it is statistically insignificant. However, including *GDUM* rather than *ONEDIGDUM* reduces the economic effect of our *SINDUM* variable. The coefficient in front of *SINDUM* is now -0.0355, but it remains statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. Despite its reduction in magnitude in this version of our model, the economic effect of sin stocks on institutional ownership is still sizeable. The sin stock comparables (defined as those with similar Fama-French (1997) industry groupings as our sin stocks) have on average about 22% of their shares held by institutions. In contrast, sin stocks have about 19% of their shares held by institutions, which is approximately a 14 percent lower institutional ownership ratio than their comparables.

In columns (3)-(6), we successively experiment with different permutations of control variables to illustrate the robustness of our finding. In column (3), we include *LOGMB* as an additional control; in column (4), we substitute *PRICEINV* for *LOGMB* since these two variables are highly correlated, as both are scaled by price. *PRICEINV* appears to reduce our sin stock effect by more than *LOGMB* does, so we will continue to use *PRICEINV* instead of *LOGMB* in the remaining specifications. In column (5), we add in *STD* (standard deviation of stock return) and find that it attracts a negative coefficient and is statistically significant, indicating that institutions tend to favor low variance stocks. Finally in column (6), we add in the average monthly return over the past twelve months (*RET*). *RET* attracts a negative coefficient and also is statistically significant. The key observation to make across all of these alternative specifications is that the coefficient in front of *SINDUM* remains statistically significant throughout at the 10% level of significance, with economic effects that are similar to that reported in column (2). For

²⁰ Falkenstein (1996) documents similar findings for a sample of mutual funds.

instance, in column (6), sin stocks are still estimated to have a 14 percent lower institutional ownership ratio than their comparables.²¹

Next, we respecify the ownership regression to disaggregate the effects of sin stocks on holdings by different classes of institutions. Note that for these regressions the data run only from 1980 to 1997.²² As described earlier, our data set disaggregates ownership information into five types of institutions: type 1 representing banks, type 2 insurance companies, type 3 mutual funds, type 4 independent investment advisors, and type 5 all other institutions, including universities, employee stock ownership plans, etc. We expect type 3 and type 4 institutions to be less constrained by social norms as compared to the other three types of institutions, since types 3 and 4 are the natural arbitrageurs in the market. Accordingly, we divide the institutions in our data set into two sub-groups, placing type 1, type 2, and type 5 in one group and type 3 and type 4 in another group. We then create two new dependent variables for the regression specification reported in column (6) of Panel A, Table 3. The first of these is the fraction of shares of a company held by type 3 and 4 institutions, and the second is the fraction of shares held by type 1, 2, and 5 institutions.

Our findings from estimating the column (6) regression specification on the new disaggregated measures of institutional ownership are reported in Panel B of Table 3. Consistent with our earlier findings for all institutions, for the type 1, 2, and 5 institutions the coefficient in front of *SINDUM* is negative (-0.0270) and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. In contrast, the coefficient in front of *SINDUM* for the type 3 and 4 institutions is smaller in absolute magnitude (-0.0111) and statistically insignificant. Indeed, a *t*-test of the difference in the magnitudes between these two coefficients (-0.0159) is statistically significant at the 1% level

²¹ The cross-sectional relationships between ownership and the various firm characteristics examined in this section also are very stable across years. (A table that reports this cross-sectional regression year by year is available on request.)

²² The truncation of our sample is necessitated by vendor-distributor compatibility issues in the data on institution types after 1997. After 1997, many institutions in the data are erroneously labeled as type 5 institutions. For completeness, we also have run a pooled regression that includes data after 1997 and found similar results.

of significance. In other words, sin stocks are not less held by mutual funds and independent investment advisors. This fits well with our hypothesis that mutual funds and hedge funds are the most likely types of institutions to play the role of arbitrageurs and buy sin stocks if they are ignored and priced cheaply.

B. Analyst Coverage

In light of our finding that sin stocks have lower institutional ownership as compared to other stocks, logic suggests that sin stocks also should be less followed by sell-side analysts who produce financial reports and analyses on companies. To test this prediction, we utilize the same methodology as developed above for our analysis of institutional ownership. This methodology also may be viewed as an extension of earlier studies on the determinants of analyst coverage, such as Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).

In this section, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression specification:

$$LOGCOV_{it} = b_0 + b_1 SINDUM_{it} + \mathbf{b}_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad i=1, \dots, N, \quad (2)$$

where $SINDUM$ equals one if the stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise; \mathbf{X}_{it} is a vector of firm characteristics and ε_{it} is measurement error. The components of \mathbf{X}_{it} and the estimation methodology are the same as described above for regression specification (1).

The results are presented in Panel C of Table 3, whose layout parallels that of Panel A above. Accordingly, we are able to quickly summarize our key findings. Notice that the coefficient in front of $SINDUM$ is negative and statistically significant across five out of the six columns representing alternative specifications of our model. The coefficient in front of $GDUM$ is tiny and statistically insignificant. In column (6), again our most conservative specification, the coefficient in front of $SINDUM$ is -0.1477 and is statistically significant at the 10% level of

significance.²³ In terms of the absolute number of analysts, the typical firm has about 2.57 analysts covering it, whereas a sin stock has about 2.19 (about one-half fewer analysts or a 15 percent decline relative to the mean). As for the other variables, they attract coefficients that are similar to what already has been documented in Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000).

One potential alternative explanation for these findings is that sin stocks are mature companies that do little equity issuance and hence attract little analyst coverage. To disentangle this effect, we construct from the SDC Equity Issuance Database the annual amount of equity issuances done by companies and include this as a control variable. Adding this variable does not change our results, and therefore we omit the results from this augmented specification for brevity.

In sum, we have obtained compelling evidence that sin stocks are less held or followed by certain institutions and analysts who discriminate against sin stocks for social norm rationales; and in their absence, arbitrageurs comprised of mutual funds and hedge funds (and individuals) are willing to buy these stocks. These findings are consistent with both Becker's theory of racial discrimination by employers and Arrow's subsequent remark on arbitrage by employers who are willing to flout social convention to take advantage of unemployed, talented labor. In our investigation of social norms in the stock market, the question that remains is whether social norms affect the prices of sin stocks, i.e. is there enough arbitrage capital to completely eliminate any norm-induced price effects?

C. Implications for Stock Prices

To address this question, we examine the return performance of sin stocks. If sin stocks are neglected, as we claim, and there are limits to arbitrage, then we ought to find that sin stocks

²³ In column (3), using *LOGMB* as a control rather than *PRICEINV* yields a much larger point estimate on *SINDUM* (-0.1704), but weakens its statistical significance. The convention in the literature is to use *PRICEINV* which we follow here for comparability. When we include the other controls as in the later columns, then we still get a statistically significant estimate on *SINDUM* even when using *LOGMB* rather than *PRICEINV* as a control.

outperform comparables. However, this is not the only norm-mediated mechanism by which sin stocks may outperform their comparables. Social norms also may increase the number of lawsuits filed against sin companies (e.g., tobacco companies), and this heightened litigation risk may be a source of higher returns. We will attempt to gauge the relative importance of these two sources of price effects in sub-section D below. In the interim, when we speak of social norm-induced effects on price or expected returns, we lump together the litigation risk and neglect effects.

We employ a number of methodologies to study the potential price effects of social norms on sin stocks. First and most conventionally, we employ the methodology of analyzing the time series of the returns of a sin stock portfolio for evidence of any excess returns, after adjusting for various well-known predictors of stock returns such as the market portfolio. One huge benefit of the time-series methodology is that we have a large sample period from 1926-2004. The first model we estimate is the CAPM:

$$R_t = \alpha + \beta VWRF_t + \varepsilon_t \quad t=1, \dots, T, \quad (5)$$

where R_t is the return on *SIN-COMP*, an equal-weighted portfolio long sin stocks and short their comparables; *VWRF* is the value-weighted market portfolio; and ε_t represents a generic error term that is uncorrelated with all other independent variables. The coefficient of interest is α , representing the excess return of the sin stock portfolio. We also consider three additional performance models by adding the portfolio returns *SMB*, *HML*, and *MOM* as independent variables in specification (5). Our most conservative specification thus is given by the following four-factor model:

$$R_t = \alpha + \beta_1 VWRF_t + \beta_2 SMB_t + \beta_3 HML_t + \beta_4 MOM_t + \varepsilon_t \quad t=1, \dots, T, \quad (6)$$

where R_t again denotes the return on the portfolio long sin stocks and short comparables, α is the excess return of that portfolio, β_i 's are loadings on the other portfolios that are used to predict R_t , and ε_t is a generic error term that is uncorrelated with all other independent variables.

The results for the various specifications are presented in Panel A of Table 4. The CAPM yields an alpha of 0.0045 (or 45 basis points per month), which is statistically significant at the 5% level. For the two-factor model (market and *SMB*), the alpha is slightly higher at 47 basis points a month and is now statistically significant at the 1% level. When we subsequently include *HML* to generate the next row of results, we find that the alpha increases to 57 basis points per month and is still highly statistically significant. Finally, we add in *MOM* and the alpha is cut down to 39 basis points per month in our most conservative specification, but it is still significant at the 5% level of significance.

Our focus on a portfolio long sin stocks and short comparables yields the most conservative estimates. Just looking at a portfolio long sin stocks would yield even more significant out-performance of sin stocks relative to these benchmarks. (Results are available from the authors and excluded for brevity). However, the time-series analysis of looking at a long sin portfolio leaves wanting whether the out-performance is simply due to their comparables having also done well.

We next use cross-sectional variation to investigate whether sin stocks outperform other comparable stocks. We estimate the following return forecasting specification:

$$EXMRET_{it} = c_0 + c_1 SINDUM_{it-1} + c_2 \mathbf{X}_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad i=1, \dots, N, \quad (4)$$

where *EXMRET* is the return of stock i net of the risk-free rate; *SINDUM* equals one if the stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise; \mathbf{X}_{it-1} is a vector of firm characteristics and ε_{it} is measurement error. \mathbf{X}_{it-1} includes various permutations of variables that have been defined earlier, including

LOGSIZE, *RET*, and *LOGMB*. Since we now are running forecasting regressions, *BETA* represents the time-varying industry beta estimated using the past three years of monthly returns. Data on firm characteristics only begins in 1962. Accordingly, the sample for our estimation of equation (4) starts in 1965.

The coefficient of interest is c_1 , which measures whether sin stocks have an abnormal return performance controlling for a host of other firm characteristics. The null hypothesis is that it is zero, whereas our prediction is that it will be significantly greater than zero. c_2 is the vector of loadings on the control variables. We then take the estimates from these monthly regressions (weighted by market capitalizations) and follow Fama and MacBeth (1973) in taking their time-series means and standard deviations (using Newey and West (1987) standard errors) to form our overall estimates of the effects of being a sin stock on return performance.

The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. While we present various permutations of the regression specification (4), the main one to focus on is the specification described in column (6) that includes beta, size, past returns, past turnover, market-to-book, *GDUM* and the log of the age of the firm (*LOGAGE*) as controls. *GDUM* picks up the effect due to comparables and *LOGAGE* has been shown to forecast firm profitability. In this specification, the coefficient in front of *SINDUM* is 0.0030 and is statistically significant at the 10% level of significance. In other words, sin stocks outperform other comparable stocks by about 30 basis points per month or about 3.6 percent per year. As earlier papers also have found, *BETA* is statistically insignificant in these cross-sectional regressions. *LOGSIZE* has a negative effect (big stocks underperform small stocks), past returns positively predict future returns (i.e., there is momentum over short horizons but not over long horizons), turnover positively forecasts returns and market-to-book negatively forecasts returns.

Finally, we compare the market-to-book ratios of sin stocks to their counterparts using the following specification adapted from Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005):

$$LOGMB_{it} = d_0 + d_1 SINDUM_{it} + d_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad i=1, \dots, N, \quad (3)$$

where *SINDUM* equals one if the stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise; \mathbf{X}_{it} is a vector of firm characteristics including return-on-equity (*ROE*), research and development expenditures as a fraction of sales (*RDSALES*), a dummy variable if the firm is missing R&D data (*RDMISS*), an S&P500 dummy (*SPDUM*) and our *GDUM* dummy capturing sin stocks and sin stock comparables (food, soda, fun, meals, and hotels); ε_{it} is measurement error; and the estimation methodology is the same as described earlier for regression specification (1).

The results are presented in Panel C of Table 4. In column (1), we run the cross-sectional regression year by year. The coefficients are subsequently aggregated using the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973), in which standard errors are adjusted for possible autocorrelation. The coefficient on *SINDUM* is -0.1664 and is significant at the 1% level of significance. We thus find sin stocks to be underpriced relative to comparables by nearly 17%. The coefficients on *ROE*, *RDSALES*, and *SPDUM* are positive and significant, while the coefficient on the dummy variable for missing R&D data is negative and significant as expected. These latter findings are consistent with the results reported by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005). Interestingly, the coefficient on *GDUM* is positive, suggesting that the prices of sin stock comparables actually are richer than those of other stocks, but it is not statistically significant. In column (2), we estimate the same model, this time using the pooling regression with standard errors clustered within 49-industry groupings. The coefficient in front of *SINDUM* drops slightly to -0.1505, but it is still significant at the 10% level of significance. The other coefficients remain qualitatively similar.

In summary, all three methodologies that we have used to investigate the price effects of social norms on sin stocks yield economically interesting effects. We view the magnitude of the effect implied by the price-to-book regressions, namely that sin stocks are underpriced by about 15% on average, as the most conservative but this methodology is the least conventional. The

economic effects implied by the returns regressions (both time-series and cross-sectional) are about 2-4% per year in expected return differential. These results are less conservative but the methodologies are much more conventional.

D. Gauging the Relative Importance of Litigation Risk versus the Neglect Effect for Sin Stock Performance

We now attempt to gauge the relative importance of litigation risk versus the neglect effect in determining the expected returns of sin stocks. Up to this point, we have used three different methodologies—namely time-series regressions, cross-sectional return regressions, and price-to-book regressions—to estimate the price effects of social norms against investing in sin companies. Since we consider the time-series regressions to be the most conventional, we will feature these in our further investigation of the likely sources of the price effects. The results presented below, however, remain qualitatively unchanged no matter which methodology is used.

In Panel A of Table 5, we examine the performance of the sin portfolio excluding tobacco stocks. This specification is motivated by the variation in litigation risk between tobacco and all other sin industries: While tobacco companies faced substantial litigation risk during most of our sample period, all other stocks in the sin portfolio, including alcohol and gaming, faced very little. As a result, if litigation risk is driving the abnormal performance of the sin portfolio, then we should see little to no excess return for a sin portfolio that excludes tobacco stocks. To this end, we replicate the time-series regressions in Panel A of Table 4, excluding tobacco stocks from the sin portfolio. So *REST-RESTCOMP* is an equal-weighted portfolio long sin stocks (excluding tobacco) and short returns of the comparables. Notice that the alphas of this long-short portfolio are similar to those reported in Panel A of Table 4. In other words, our results from Panel A of Table 4 are not all driven by tobacco stocks. As such, these results strongly indicate that our sin stock results are not likely to be driven by litigation risk.

In Panel B, we investigate the litigation risk hypothesis within the context of the tobacco industry, taking advantage of time variation in the litigation risk faced by that industry. Specifically, we consider the prices of tobacco stocks during the period 1998-2004, a period in which litigation risk dropped substantially for tobacco companies on account of their historic settlement with the states on June 20, 1997. Under the terms of the tobacco deal, the participating tobacco companies accepted cigarette tax increases in exchange for the termination of all lawsuits filed by the participating states (see Bulow and Klemperer (1998) for a review of this deal). Most analysts have agreed that tobacco companies got off easily and that their litigation risk dropped substantially after 1997. Accordingly, we expect the returns to tobacco companies to be substantially lower during the period of 1998-2004 as compared to the period prior to the tobacco settlement, if litigation risk were driving price performance. Interestingly, however, we find in Panel B that the alphas of tobacco stocks net of the comparables from the food industry (*TOB-FOOD*) are still quite high during this later period, though the time-series results are understandably not statistically significant given the short sample period.

In Panel C, we take a closer look at the litigation risk hypothesis by separating tobacco stocks into those with foreign operations and those without. The idea is that companies with foreign operations face lower litigation risk because their liability is likely to be proportional to the extent of their domestic operations, and hence these companies should have lower alphas than those of companies without any foreign operations. From COMPUSTAT, we are able to obtain the fraction of income a company generates in foreign markets each year; this data, however, is only available starting in 1984. Over a truncated sample period starting in 1984, we replicate the regression of Panel A, except that we divide tobacco stocks into two groups: those with foreign income (*FOR*) and those without foreign income (*DOM*). Our test is to look at the alpha of a portfolio long domestic tobacco stocks and short those with foreign operations (*DOM-FOR*). If our tobacco results are due largely to litigation risk, we would expect there to be a positive alpha for *DOM-FOR*. There is essentially little difference in the returns of these two sub-sets of

tobacco stocks, i.e. the alpha of the *DOM-FOR* is basically zero. This suggests that litigation risk, at least when measured by foreign operations, is not driving the abnormal price performance of tobacco stocks.

In results that we have omitted for brevity, we also have explored another disaggregation of tobacco stocks to test the litigation risk hypothesis, based upon market share. In particular, we have broken out the top 5 tobacco stocks in terms of market share (Philip Morris, RJR, Brown and Williamson, Lorillard, and Liggett) from the rest of the tobacco market. By virtue of their dominance of the US market during our sample period, these five companies presumably faced the bulk of the litigation risk and should have earned higher returns than the rest of the tobacco industry. Our negative findings from this investigation are similar to those that we have reported above from sorting companies on foreign income. Together, these results lead us to deduce that the neglect effect is the more likely source of the excess returns of the sin stocks.

E. Time-Varying Tobacco Norms and the Effects of Social Norms on the Corporate Financing Decisions of Sin Companies

We now seek to further validate our estimated price effects of social norms on sin stocks by exploiting time variation in the social norms governing tobacco. As we described earlier in Section II, tobacco was not widely considered to be sinful until the mid-sixties. Accordingly, our hypothesis suggests that before that time, tobacco stocks should have been held by institutions and covered by analysts as frequently as other stocks, and they should not have earned excess returns. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we can only test the implications regarding returns, since the returns data date back to the 1920's whereas data on ownership and coverage are only available since the 1980's.

In Table 6, we implement the most conservative (four-factor) time-series return regression, whose results for all sin stocks were reported in Panel A of Table 4, for tobacco stocks only over the distinct time periods of 1926-1964 and 1965-2004. Since tobacco was not

considered to be sinful until the latter period, we expect the equal-weighted portfolio of long tobacco stocks and short comparables (*TOB-FOOD*) to perform much better during the latter period as compared to the earlier period. This is in fact what we find. Notice that the return of this portfolio in the latter period has a monthly alpha of 0.0053, as compared to a value of 0.0005 during the earlier period. This difference is significant at the 10% level of significance and is economically sizeable. Accordingly, we conclude that the behavior of tobacco stock returns over time is consistent with that of a regime change in social norms toward tobacco companies.

Finally, we investigate the implications of the price effects of social norms for the financing decisions of sin companies. If the equity of sin stocks is undervalued as we have argued in this paper, and hence it is more expensive for sin companies to finance operations using equity, then we should expect them to use private debt to finance their operations. Debt markets offer the additional advantage of being less transparent than equity markets. Whereas mutual funds and institutions are required to disclose their positions in equities on a semi-annual basis, no such requirements exist for investments in corporate bonds. Accordingly, it is difficult to figure out for a given company who its financiers are on the debt side. While it is possible to track down large public issuances of corporate bonds, large amounts of bank debt are difficult to trace. Former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt, who pushed to increase transparency in the bond market during his tenure, once remarked, “The sad truth is that investors in the corporate bond market do not enjoy the same access to information as a car buyer or a home buyer or, dare I say, a fruit buyer. And that’s unacceptable.”²⁴

To determine if sin companies indeed use the debt market more than the equity market, we implement a standard cross-sectional regression specification used in the corporate finance literature to explain capital structure, i.e. leverage (see for example Baker and Wurgler (2002)). We estimate the following cross-sectional regression specification:

²⁴ The full text of Arthur Levitt’s speech from which this quote has been excerpted can be downloaded from <http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch218.htm>.

$$FinancingDecision_{it} = e_0 + e_1 SINDUM_{it} + e_2 \mathbf{X}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad i=1, \dots, N, \quad (7)$$

where *SINDUM* equals one if the stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise; \mathbf{X}_{it} is a vector of firm characteristics and ε_{it} is measurement error. \mathbf{X}_{it} includes the variables *GDUM*, *TOBQ*, *TANG*, *PROFIT*, and *LOGSALES*. The coefficient of interest is e_1 , which measures whether sin firms have a different capital structure as compared to other companies. The null hypothesis is that it is zero, whereas our prediction is that it will be significantly greater than zero when a measure of leverage is used as the dependent variable in the regression. e_2 is the vector of loadings on the control variables. We then take the estimates from a pooled regression and cluster standard errors by the 49 Fama and French (plus gaming) industries.

The results are presented in Table 7. In column (1), the dependent variable is market leverage, *MLEV*. The coefficient in front of *SINDUM* is positive (0.0454) and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. The typical company has a market leverage of 0.28, and thus we find that a sin company has a 13.9% higher leverage ratio than the typical company. The coefficient on *GDUM* is basically zero. The coefficients in front of the other variables (other than *GDUM*) are significant, as found in earlier work. In the regression that uses book leverage (*BLEV*) as the dependent variable, the coefficient on *SINDUM* again comes in with the right sign, but it is not as statistically significant as its counterpart in the regression analysis of *MLEV*. For completeness, we also look to see whether there are differences in other financing decision variables (*CASH*, *PAYOUT*, *DIVPAY*, *REP*) between sin stocks and other companies. The sin stock effects are not statistically significant in these other regressions. In sum, it appears that sin companies rely more on the debt market for financing than do other firms, consistent with the hypothesis that they face a disadvantage in the equity market, but they do not differ markedly in their other financing decisions.²⁵

²⁵ We omit the detailed year-by-year regressions for brevity. Like earlier results, the coefficients are fairly stable from year-to-year. These results can be obtained from the authors.

V. Robustness Checks and Extensions

We have explored a number of robustness checks and extensions to the findings reported in this paper, which we will briefly describe in this section but omit their full reporting for brevity. As we mentioned earlier in Section II, defense stocks are considered by some to be sinful. We have redone all of our analyses with defense stocks included in the sin category. Our results remain qualitatively similar but become slightly weaker both economically and statistically, as defense stocks seem to be adding measurement error to our sin stock categorization. This confirms our initial decision to focus on the so-called Triumvirate of Sin (alcohol, tobacco, and gaming) since there is much stronger consensus on the characterization of these industries.

We also have attempted to test indirect implications of our hypotheses. Since sin stocks are followed less by analysts and institutions, they may have higher illiquidity or bid-ask spreads. However, we find only negligible differences in bid-ask spreads between sin stocks and other stocks. There are a few reasons that may explain this negative finding. First, most sin companies are highly regulated and have much better disclosure than do other companies. Accordingly, there may be less information asymmetry for these stocks, leading to potentially lower spreads. Second, the lack of institutional ownership actually has an ambiguous effect on spreads depending on assumptions about the trading process. Therefore, indirect implications regarding liquidity or other market micro-structure aspects of these companies are difficult to measure unless we have more direct measures of the informational environments of companies.

VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we provide evidence of significant effects of social norms on markets by studying the investing environment of “sin” stocks—publicly traded companies involved in the production of alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. Our main hypothesis is that there is a societal norm against funding operations that promote human vice and that some investors, particularly

institutions subject to public scrutiny and social norms, pay a financial price for not holding these stocks.

We provide a number of findings in support of this hypothesis. Sin stocks have less institutional ownership and less analyst coverage than otherwise comparable stocks. However, mutual fund companies and hedge funds play the role of the arbitrageur to some degree, as we find that these investor types are equally willing to hold sin stocks as compared to other stocks. Notwithstanding this arbitrage effect, our analysis associates social norms with significant price effects: Sin stocks are under-priced and outperform comparables even after controlling for well-known return predictors. We find no systematic relationship between sin stock returns and various proxies for litigation risk, which suggests that sin stocks are underpriced due to them being neglected by norm-constrained investors. For the tobacco industry, which did not face negative social norms until the mid-sixties, we find that the undervaluing of stock prices and excess stock returns coincide with the development of those norms, further validating our main hypothesis. Finally, we find that sin companies rely more on debt as compared to equity to finance their operations, since the debt market is less transparent than the equity market. Taken together, our findings indicate that social norms can have important consequences in the stock market, and in markets more generally.

Our paper contributes to several literatures. The first is the literature on social norms and markets. There is little empirical evidence on the effects of social norms in markets, and our paper provides a rich context and data with which to measure these effects. The second is the literature on institutional ownership and the factors that drive institutional holdings. We know relatively little about what drives institutional ownership beyond simple correlations, and this paper provides evidence that social norms can significantly influence institutional holdings. The third is the literature on the value-glamour effect. Our paper provides an example of a set of value stocks, the source of whose value comes from them being neglected for social norm reasons. Much more work remains to be done on the empirics of social norms, and we are

hopeful that the stock market will continue to provide fertile ground for this important area of research.

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Table 1: Profile of Sin Stocks

This table reports summary statistics about the sin stocks. In Panel A, we report year-by-year the number of sin stocks that fall into the three sub-groups of tobacco, alcohol, and gaming. In Panel B, we report market betas calculated using value-weighted monthly returns on 48 Fama and French (1997) industry portfolios along with our 49th gaming portfolio. The data span the period of 1926-2004.

Panel A: Distribution by Year

Year	All	Tobacco	Alcohol	Gaming
1926	18	15	3	0
1927	21	18	3	0
1928	20	17	3	0
1929	21	17	4	0
1930	21	17	4	0
1931	21	17	4	0
1932	21	17	4	0
1933	22	16	6	0
1934	22	16	6	0
1935	23	16	7	0
1936	25	16	9	0
1937	25	16	9	0
1938	25	16	9	0
1939	25	16	9	0
1940	25	16	9	0
1941	23	14	9	0
1942	23	14	9	0
1943	23	14	9	0
1944	23	14	9	0
1945	24	14	10	0
1946	26	14	12	0
1947	27	14	12	1
1948	27	13	13	1
1949	26	12	13	1
1950	25	11	13	1
1951	25	11	13	1
1952	24	11	12	1
1953	25	11	13	1
1954	25	11	13	1
1955	25	11	13	1
1956	25	11	13	1
1957	24	10	13	1
1958	23	9	13	1
1959	23	10	12	1
1960	23	10	12	1
1961	23	10	12	1
1962	23	10	12	1
1963	25	10	13	2
1964	26	11	13	2
1965	26	11	13	2
1966	26	11	13	2
1967	27	11	14	2
1968	27	11	14	2
1969	30	11	16	3
1970	32	12	16	4
1971	32	12	16	4
1972	38	12	20	6
1973	41	12	22	7

1974	41	12	22	7
1975	42	12	23	7
1976	42	12	23	7
1977	42	12	23	7
1978	45	12	23	10
1979	48	12	23	13
1980	50	12	24	14
1981	55	12	24	19
1982	56	12	25	19
1983	58	11	26	21
1984	62	12	27	23
1985	62	11	27	24
1986	60	9	26	25
1987	59	9	24	26
1988	60	9	24	27
1989	61	9	25	27
1990	64	9	23	32
1991	67	10	23	34
1992	70	11	21	38
1993	90	11	23	56
1994	98	11	22	65
1995	106	13	25	68
1996	110	15	30	65
1997	116	16	32	68
1998	107	13	31	63
1999	98	13	32	53
2000	82	11	29	42
2001	73	9	26	38
2002	69	7	25	37
2003	65	7	23	35
2004	63	8	21	34
Total	193	36	62	95

Panel B: Industry Market Betas

Industry	Beta	Industry	Beta
Agriculture	0.97	Guns	0.92
Food	0.73	Gold	0.74
Soda	0.82	Mines	1.00
Beer	0.76	Coal	1.00
Smoke	0.74	Oil	0.78
Toys	1.45	Utilities	0.55
Fun	1.28	Telecommunication	0.80
Books	1.06	Personal Services	1.18
Household	0.95	Business Services	1.36
Clothes	1.11	Computers	1.18
Healthcare	1.28	Chips	1.44
Medical Equipment	0.90	Laboratory Equipment	1.43
Drugs	0.87	Paper	1.00
Chemicals	0.98	Boxes	0.87
Rubber	1.11	Transport	1.10
Textiles	0.98	Wholesalers	1.12
Building Materials	1.09	Retailers	1.04
Construction	1.30	Meals	1.16
Steel	1.12	Banks	1.03
Fabricated Products	1.04	Insurance	0.90
Machinery	1.17	Real Estate	1.13
Electrical Equipment	1.23	Financials	1.06
Autos	1.00	Other	1.15
Aero	1.12	Gaming	1.15
Ships	0.97		

Table 2: Summary Statistics

This table reports summary statistics for the variables used for the six sets of regressions. Panel A reports the summary statistics (time-series averages of cross-sectional means and standard deviations) for the institutional ownership regressions. Institutional ownership (*IO*) is the fraction of shares of a firm held by institutions. *LOGSIZE* is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the company. *LOGMB* is the logarithm of the market to book variable. *STD* is the daily stock return standard deviation during the past year. *BETA* is the firm's industry market beta. *PRINV* is the inverse of the stock price. *RET* is the arithmetic average of the last year's monthly returns. These variables are calculated at the end of the year. Panel B reports the similar summary statistics for the analyst coverage regressions. *LOGCOV* is the log of one plus the number of analyst estimates issued on a company at the end of the year. The other variables in Panel B are constructed in the same way as in Panel A except over a different time period. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the time-series return regressions. *EXSINP* (*EXCOMP*) is the excess monthly return net of the risk-free for an equal-weighted portfolio of sin stocks (comparable stocks). *MKTPREM* is the excess monthly return of the value-weighted CRSP index. *SMB* is the return of a portfolio long small stocks and short large stocks. *HML* is the return of a portfolio long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks. *MOM* is the return of a portfolio long past twelve-month return winners and short past twelve-month return losers. Panel D reports the summary statistics for the cross-sectional return regressions. *EXMRET* is the monthly return of a stock net of the risk-free rate. *LOGSIZE*, *LOGMB*, and *RET* are now calculated at the end of each month. *BETA* is just the firm's industry beta, which is now calculated at the end of each month using the past 36-months of data. *TURN*, calculated at the end of month, is the daily share turnover during the past 12-months. *LOGAGE* is the natural logarithm of the firm's age, measured by the number of years available in the CRSP/Compustat data. Panel E reports the summary statistics for the price-to-book regressions. *ROE* is return on equity. *RDSALES* is the fraction of research and development expenditures to firm sales. Panel F reports the statistics for the financing decision regressions. *MLEV* is market leverage. *BLEV* is book leverage. *CASH* is cash balances. *DIVPAY* is the dividend payout ratio. *REP* is share repurchases. *PAYOUT* is the overall firm payout ratio. *TOBQ* is Tobin's Q, which is market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity over assets. *TANG* is firm tangibility defined as net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. *PROFIT* is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets. *LOGSALES* is the log of net sales.

Panel A: Institutional Ownership Regressions (1980-2003)

Variable	Time-Series Average of Means	Time-Series Average of Standard Deviations
<i>IO</i>	0.27	0.22
<i>LOGSIZE</i> ('000)	11.16	2.06
<i>LOGMB</i>	0.65	0.91
<i>STD</i> (%)	4.13	2.45
<i>BETA</i>	1.10	0.23
<i>PRINV</i>	0.50	1.28
<i>RET</i> (%)	1.23	5.79

Panel B: Analyst Coverage Regressions (1976-2003)

Variable	Time-Series Average of Means	Time-Series Average of Standard Deviations
<i>LOGCOV</i>	0.91	0.99
<i>LOGSIZE</i> ('000)	11.03	2.04
<i>LOGMB</i>	0.56	0.89
<i>STD</i> (%)	3.92	2.30
<i>BETA</i>	1.09	0.23
<i>PRINV</i>	0.45	1.15
<i>RET</i> (%)	1.43	5.54

Panel C: Time-Series Return Regressions (1926-2004)

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
<i>EXSINP</i> (%)	1.19	7.10
<i>EXCOMP</i> (%)	0.91	7.73
<i>MKTPREM</i> (%)	0.65	5.49
<i>SMB</i> (%)	0.25	3.38
<i>HML</i> (%)	0.40	3.61
<i>MOM</i> (%)	0.75	4.73

Panel D: Cross-Sectional Return Regressions (1965-2004)

Variable	Time-Series Average of Means	Time-Series Average of Standard Deviations
<i>EXMRET</i> (%)	0.83	16.45
<i>LOGSIZE</i> ('000)	10.90	1.92
<i>BETA</i>	1.11	0.30
<i>TURN</i> (%)	0.30	0.62
<i>LOGMB</i>	0.30	0.83
<i>RET</i> (%)	1.30	4.35
<i>LOGAGE</i>	2.13	0.98

Panel E: Price-to-Book Regressions (1965-2004)

Variable	Time-Series Average of Means	Time-Series Average of Standard Deviations
<i>LOGMB</i>	0.37	0.76
<i>ROE</i> (%)	13.79	7.37
<i>RDSALES</i> (%)	29.55	8.10

Panel F: Corporate Financing Decisions Regressions (1962-2003)

Variable	Time-Series Average of Means	Time-Series Average of Standard Deviations
<i>BLEV</i>	0.35	0.27
<i>MLEV</i>	0.28	0.23
<i>CASH</i>	0.15	0.20
<i>PAYOUT</i>	0.27	1.08
<i>DIVPAY</i>	0.20	0.40
<i>REP</i>	0.10	0.71
<i>TOBQ</i>	1.78	1.63
<i>TANG</i>	0.34	0.23
<i>PROFIT</i>	0.09	0.19
<i>LOGSALES</i>	-0.00	0.87

Table 3: Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage of Sin Stocks

In Panel A, the dependent variable is institutional ownership (*IO*), which is calculated at the end of each year. *SINDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise. *GDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock or comes from the Fama and French (1997) industry groupings: 2 (food), 3 (soda), 7 (fun), and 43 (meals) and zero otherwise. *LOGSIZE* is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the company. *LOGMB* is the logarithm of the market-to-book variable. *STD* is the daily stock return standard deviation during the past year. *BETA* is the firm's industry market beta. *PRINV* is the inverse of the stock price. *RET* is the average monthly return during the past year. *NASD* equals one if the stock is listed on NASDAQ and zero otherwise. *SP500* equals one if the stock is in the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. These variables are calculated at the end of the year. Panel A reports the results of a pooled regression with Moulton's (1986) standard errors clustered at the 49-industry groupings. The ownership data cover the period 1980-2003. Panel B reports the results, in which the dependent variable is ownership by two sub-groups. In the first column, dependent variable is fraction of shares held by type 1 (banks), type 2 (insurance companies), and type 5 (others including pension plans, endowments, and employee-ownership plans) institutions. In the second column, the dependent variable is shares held by type 3 (mutual funds) and type 4 (independent investment advisors) institutions. *T*-test of the difference of the coefficients in front of *SINDUM* across these two regressions is provided (Greene, 2000). The data for Panel B runs only from 1980-1997. In Panel C, the dependent variable is analyst coverage, calculated as a log of one plus the number of analyst estimates issued on a stock at the end of the year (*LOGCOV*). The analyst data is from the period 1976-2003. *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance.

Panel A: Institutional Ownership

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SINDUM</i>	-0.0519*** (0.0094)	-0.0355* (0.0197)	-0.0378** (0.0179)	-0.0356* (0.0201)	-0.0337* (0.0192)	-0.0333* (0.0191)
<i>ONEDIGDUM</i>	0.0016 (0.0113)					
<i>GDUM</i>		-0.0167 (0.0209)	-0.0180 (0.0197)	-0.0167 (0.0211)	-0.0184 (0.0205)	-0.0192 (0.0205)
<i>LOGSIZE</i>	0.0828*** (0.0023)	0.0828*** (0.0023)	0.0912*** (0.0032)	0.0845*** (0.0024)	0.0825*** (0.0023)	0.0841*** (0.0024)
<i>BETA</i>	0.1286*** (0.0386)	0.1275*** (0.0401)	0.1407*** (0.0436)	0.1295*** (0.0398)	0.1379*** (0.0394)	0.1390*** (0.0396)
<i>LOGMB</i>			-0.0373*** (0.0040)			
<i>PRICEINV</i>				0.0072*** (0.0013)	0.0123*** (0.0015)	0.0102*** (0.0014)
<i>STD</i>					-0.6794*** (0.1680)	-0.6175*** (0.1674)
<i>RET</i>						-0.2230*** (0.0173)
<i>NASD</i>	-0.0122** (0.0048)	-0.0120** (0.0051)	0.0094* (0.0052)	-0.0120** (0.0051)	-0.0043 (0.0043)	-0.0021 (0.0043)
<i>SP500</i>	-0.0292*** (0.0099)	-0.0291*** (0.0097)	-0.0367*** (0.0095)	-0.0328*** (0.0097)	-0.0324*** (0.0093)	-0.0359*** (0.0093)

Panel B: Pooled Regressions by Different Types of Institutions

Variable	(Type 1+2+5)	(Type 3+4)
<i>SINDUM</i>	-0.0270** (0.0124)	-0.0111 (0.0134)
<i>GDUM</i>	-0.0035 (0.0101)	-0.0177 (0.0142)
<i>LOGSIZE</i>	0.0270*** (0.0010)	0.0465*** (0.0023)
<i>BETA</i>	0.0237 (0.0152)	0.1213*** (0.0270)
<i>PRICEINV</i>	0.0064*** (0.0006)	0.0026* (0.0013)
<i>STD</i>	-0.4492*** (0.0563)	-0.3164*** (0.0907)
<i>RET</i>	-0.1432*** (0.0094)	0.0019 (0.0186)
<i>NASD</i>	-0.0202*** (0.0023)	0.0187*** (0.0032)
<i>SP500</i>	0.0388*** (0.0050)	-0.0441** (0.0066)
<i>t</i> -test of difference of coefficients in front of <i>SINDUM</i>		-0.0159*** (0.0064)

Panel C: Analyst Coverage

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SINDUM</i>	-0.1702** (0.0762)	-0.1477* (0.0872)	-0.1704 (0.1155)	-0.1507* (0.0816)	-0.1504* (0.0820)	-0.1477* (0.0807)
<i>ONEDIGDUM</i>	0.0076 (0.0234)					
<i>GDUM</i>		-0.0203 (0.0485)	-0.0221 (0.0447)	-0.0201 (0.0488)	-0.0203 (0.0488)	-0.0261 (0.0466)
<i>LOGSIZE</i>	0.3516*** (0.0073)	0.3516*** (0.0071)	0.3933*** (0.0072)	0.3700*** (0.0075)	0.3696*** (0.0073)	0.3825*** (0.0072)
<i>BETA</i>	0.0788 (0.0646)	0.0776 (0.0641)	0.1245** (0.0491)	0.1044 (0.0691)	0.1068 (0.0687)	0.1174* (0.0668)
<i>LOGMB</i>			-0.1385*** (0.0109)			
<i>PRICEINV</i>				0.0709*** (0.0048)	0.0721*** (0.0052)	0.0527*** (0.0038)
<i>STD</i>					-0.1999 (0.2629)	0.2748 (0.2439)
<i>RET</i>						-2.1788*** (0.0540)
<i>NASD</i>	-0.0777*** (0.0270)	-0.0773*** (0.0272)	0.0309 (0.0266)	-0.0831*** (0.0275)	-0.0808*** (0.0279)	-0.0623*** (0.0276)
<i>SP500</i>	0.3796*** (0.0325)	0.3800*** (0.0326)	0.3179*** (0.0315)	0.3382*** (0.0315)	0.3376*** (0.0316)	0.3055*** (0.0309)

Table 4: Price and Return Performance of Sin Stocks

Panel A reports the results for the time-series regressions of a portfolio (SIN-COMP) that is long *SIN* (the monthly return for an equal-weighted portfolio of sin stocks) and short *COMP* (the monthly return for an equal-weighted portfolio of comparable stocks) on a host of well-known factors for the period of 1926-2004. *MKTPREM* is the excess monthly return of the value-weighted CRSP index. *SMB* is the return of a portfolio long small stocks and short large stocks. *HML* is the return of a portfolio long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks. *MOM* is the return of a portfolio long past twelve-month return winners and short past twelve-month return losers. Panel B reports the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions (weighted by firm market capitalization) for the period of 1965-2004 of *EXMRET*, the monthly return of a stock net of the risk-free rate on the lagged (previous month) values of a set of well-known predictors of stock returns. *SINDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise. *LOGSIZE*, *LOGMB*, and *RET* are now calculated at the end of each month. *BETA* is just the firm's industry beta, which is now calculated at the end of each month using the past 36-months of data. *TURN*, calculated at the end of month, is the daily share turnover during the past 12-months. *EXMRET* at month *t* is regressed on the previous month values of *LOGSIZE*, *LOGMB*, *RET*, *BETA*, *TURN*, which are denoted by *LOGSIZE1*, *LOGMB1*, *RET1*, *BETA1*, and *TURN1*. *LOGAGE1* is the log of the age of the company. Panel C reports the results for a regression of the log of a stock's market-to-book ratio (*LOGMB*) on a host of explanatory variables for the period 1965-2004. *SINDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise. *ROE* is firm's return-on-equity, *RDSALES* is the ratio of a firm's research and development expenditures to firm sales, *RDMISS* equals one if a firm is missing R&D expenditure data and zero otherwise. *SP500* equals one if the stock is in the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. *GDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock or comes from the Fama and French (1997) industry groupings: 2 (food), 3 (soda), 7 (fun), and 43 (meals) and zero otherwise. Column (1) of Panel A is estimated using the cross-sectional regression with standard errors calculated as in Fama and MacBeth (1973). Column (2), in turn, estimates the same model using a pooled regression. Standard errors are clustered at the 49-industry groupings. *** 1%; ** 5%; * 10% significance.

Panel A: Time-Series Return Regressions (Net of Comparables): 1926-2004

Variable	ALPHA	MKTPREM	SMB	HML	MOM
SIN- COMP	0.0045** (0.0018)	-0.2641*** (0.0874)			
SIN- COMP	0.0047*** (0.0018)	-0.2384*** (0.0896)	-0.1288 (0.1242)		
SIN- COMP	0.0057*** (0.0017)	-0.1944*** (0.0591)	-0.1192 (0.1327)	-0.3218*** (0.1092)	
SIN- COMP	0.0039** (0.0016)	-0.1585*** (0.0467)	-0.1066 (0.1343)	-0.2610*** (0.0832)	0.1666** (0.0713)

Panel B: Cross-Section Regressions: 1965-2004

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>SINDUM</i>	0.0022 (0.0017)	0.0017 (0.0017)	0.0027* (0.0017)	0.0027* (0.0016)	0.0033** (0.0016)	0.0030* (0.0017)
<i>BETA1</i>	0.0076** (0.0033)	0.0049 (0.0033)	0.0018 (0.0026)	0.0009 (0.0023)	0.0028 (0.0023)	0.0029 (0.0023)
<i>LOGSIZE</i>		-0.0028*** (0.0004)	-0.0025*** (0.0004)	-0.0024*** (0.0004)	-0.0018*** (0.0004)	-0.0015*** (0.0004)
<i>RET1</i>			0.1105*** (0.0322)	0.1031*** (0.0310)	0.1196*** (0.0298)	0.1154*** (0.0293)
<i>TURN1</i>				0.1923 (0.2374)	0.2517 (0.2337)	0.2466 (0.2281)
<i>LOGMB1</i>					-0.0031*** (0.0009)	-0.0035*** (0.0009)
<i>GDUM</i>						0.0006 (0.0011)
<i>LOGAGE</i>						-0.0009** (0.0004)

Panel C: M/B Regressions: 1965-2004

Variable	(1)	(2)
<i>SINDUM</i>	-0.1664*** (0.0306)	-0.1505* (0.0904)
<i>ROE/100</i>	0.3774* (0.1981)	0.0124*** (0.0031)
<i>RDSALES</i>	0.0007*** (0.0002)	0.0007*** (0.0002)
<i>RDMISS</i>	-0.1410** (0.0610)	-0.2463*** (0.0669)
<i>SP500</i>	0.2982*** (0.0560)	0.3368*** (0.0811)
<i>GDUM</i>	0.0463 (0.0297)	0.0305 (0.0693)

Table 5: The Relative Importance of Litigation Risk and the Neglect Effect for Sin Stock Prices

Panel A reports results of the return regression analogous to Panel A of Table 4, except that tobacco stocks are dropped from the portfolio. Panel B reports results of the return regression analogous to Panel A of Table 4 except that only tobacco stocks are included among sin stocks and the period is 1998-2004. Panel C reports results of the return regression similar to Panel A except that we divide tobacco stocks into two groups: those with foreign operations (*FOR*) and those without foreign operations (*DOM*). *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance.

Panel A: Sin Stocks Without Tobacco (Net of Comparables): 1926-2004

Variable	ALPHA	MKTPREM	SMB	HML	MOM
<i>REST</i> –	0.0043**	-0.2495***			
<i>RESTCOMP</i>	(0.0018)	(0.0888)			
<i>REST</i> –	0.0044**	-0.2324**	-0.0861		
<i>RESTCOMP</i>	(0.0018)	(0.0907)	(0.1194)		
<i>REST</i> –	0.0055***	-0.1865***	-0.0762	-0.3348***	
<i>RESTCOMP</i>	(0.0018)	(0.0595)	(0.1285)	(0.1096)	
<i>REST</i> –	0.0036**	-0.1488***	-0.0629	-0.2701***	0.1753**
<i>RESTCOMP</i>	(0.0016)	(0.0469)	(0.1303)	(0.0829)	(0.0713)

Panel B: Tobacco Stocks Only, Time-Series Regressions: 1998-2004

Variable	ALPHA	MKTPREM	SMB	HML	MOM
<i>TOB – FOOD</i>	0.0147	0.2192			
	(0.0104)	(0.2711)			
<i>TOB – FOOD</i>	0.0167	0.3234	-0.4658*		
	(0.0106)	(0.2963)	(0.2650)		
<i>TOB – FOOD</i>	0.0140	0.4700	-0.3215	0.3709	
	(0.0097)	(0.3568)	(0.3172)	(0.3508)	
<i>TOB – FOOD</i>	0.0138	0.4817	-0.3283	0.3767	0.0212
	(0.0098)	(0.3987)	(0.3690)	(0.3628)	(0.2568)

Panel C: Time-Series Return Regressions: Tobacco Stocks Divided into Those with Foreign Sales and Those without: 1984-2004

Variable	ALPHA	MKTPREM	SMB	HML	MOM
<i>DOM – FOR</i>	-0.0001	0.0083			
	(0.0036)	(0.0749)			
<i>DOM – FOR</i>	0.0001	-0.0477	0.4094***		
	(0.0035)	(0.0730)	(0.1230)		
<i>DOM – FOR</i>	0.0004	-0.0680	0.3881**	-0.0639	
	(0.0034)	(0.0753)	(0.1611)	(0.1789)	
<i>DOM – FOR</i>	0.0009	-0.0765	0.3929**	-0.0720	-0.0465
	(0.0035)	(0.0753)	(0.1634)	(0.1762)	(0.0677)

Table 6: Time-Varying Norms for Tobacco Stocks

This table reports the results for the time-series regressions of *TOB* (the equal-weighted monthly return on tobacco industry) minus *FOOD* (the equal-weighted monthly return on food industry) on a host of well-known factors for two subperiods: 1926-1964 and 1965-2004. *MKTPREM* is the excess monthly return of the value-weighted CRSP index. *SMB* is the return of a portfolio long small stocks and short large stocks. *HML* is the return of a portfolio long high book-to-market stocks and short low book-to-market stocks. *MOM* is the return of a portfolio long past twelve-month return winners and short past twelve-month return losers. *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance.

Variable	<i>ALPHA</i>	<i>MKTPREM</i>	<i>SMB</i>	<i>HML</i>	<i>MOM</i>
<i>TOB – FOOD</i>					
1926-1964	0.0005 (0.0016)	-0.1091** (0.0511)	-0.1550 (0.1185)	-0.1882** (0.0817)	0.0746 (0.0683)
1965-2004	0.0053* (0.0029)	0.0480 (0.0921)	-0.2998*** (0.1162)	0.0488 (0.1328)	-0.0843 (0.1144)

Table 7: Corporate Financing Decisions of Sin Companies

This table reports estimates from the pooled regression of sin companies' corporate financing decisions on well-known predictors of capital structure for the period of 1962-2003. The dependent variables are market leverage (*MLEV*), book leverage (*BLEV*), cash balances (*CASH*), overall firm payout ratio (*PAYOUT*), dividend payout ratio (*DIVPAY*), and share repurchases (*REP*). *SINDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock and zero otherwise. *GDUM* equals one if a stock is a sin stock or comes from the Fama and French (1997) industry groupings: 2 (food), 3 (soda), 7 (fun), and 43 (meals) and zero otherwise. *TOBQ* is Tobin's Q, which is market value of equity plus assets minus book value of equity over assets. *TANG* is firm tangibility defined as net plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. *PROFIT* is earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation divided by total assets. *LOGSALES* is the log of net sales. All variables have been winsorized at the 1% level. *** 1% significance; ** 5% significance; * 10% significance.

Variable	<i>MLEV</i>	<i>BLEV</i>	<i>CASH</i>	<i>PAYOUT</i>	<i>DIVPAY</i>	<i>REP</i>
<i>SINDUM</i>	0.0454** (0.0219)	0.0621 (0.0444)	-0.0153 (0.0283)	-0.0122 (0.1000)	0.0241 (0.1037)	-0.0079 (0.0189)
<i>GDUM</i>	-0.0076 (0.0128)	0.0032 (0.0094)	0.0204 (0.0123)	0.0030 (0.0663)	-0.0405 (0.0682)	0.0413** (0.0187)
<i>TOBQ</i>	-0.0447*** (0.0055)	-0.0206*** (0.0021)	0.0416*** (0.0021)	-0.0074*** (0.0027)	-0.0082*** (0.0022)	0.0029** (0.0012)
<i>TANG</i>	0.2795*** (0.0453)	0.3202*** (0.0350)	-0.2803*** (0.0337)	0.1911** (0.0896)	0.2864** (0.1242)	-0.0742** (0.0329)
<i>PROFIT</i>	-0.1470*** (0.0395)	-0.2178*** (0.0324)	-0.0199 (0.0299)	0.2798*** (0.0366)	0.1814*** (0.0272)	0.1061*** (0.0190)
<i>LOGSALES</i>	0.0187** (0.0086)	0.0192* (0.0101)	-0.0558*** (0.0097)	0.0145 (0.0141)	0.0099 (0.0135)	0.0019 (0.0039)